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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an evaluation- of the performance of
a tactical route decision aid model that was developed by CPT
Charles Shaw in his 1989 Master's thesis. The decision aid was
developed as a module inside the Condensed Army Mobility Management
Model (CAMMS). The decision aid selects tactical routes based upon
a complex methodology which considers a number of variables in the
tactical situation and the time available. The Janus(A) high
resolution combat model was chosen to compare the routes selected
by the decision aid against routes selected by active duty officers
in two different areas of operation. A measure of effectiveness
was selected based on the casualty figures generated by the
Janus(A) model. When compared against the officer routes using the
MOE, decision aid routes were more effective in one of the two
areas of operation. Janus(A) was also used to determine if routes
the decision aid deemed as "better" were more effective as measured
by the MOE. The study found that some of the "better" routes were
actually less effective in Janus(A). The study concludes that the
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In every offensive scenario, land combat leaders of both
the Army and the Marine Corps must decide where to move their
forces in order to reach their objective. A host of factors
may influence this decision including the mission of the
force, the enemy strength and disposition, the time available,
the terrain, and many others. Commanders must weight each of
these factors within the context of the overall tactical
situation to make their decision. These leaders carefully
consider this decision as they know that the route they select
will significantly affect the success or failure of their
mission.
The route to the objective is so important because it
helps to determine the time of arrival and the strength of the
attacking force on the objective. A good route might allow
the attackers to arrive on time and yet avoid much of the
firepower from the enemy's covered and concealed defensive
position. It could even help them to avoid detection
altogether and achieve complete tactical surprise. The
attacker could then bring the maximum amount of firepower to
bear against the defenders at the objective. A bad route, on
the other hand, might leave the attacker unnecessarily
exposed to lethal enemy fires. This could squander much of
his firepower thus preventing victory.
Currently officers select routes basted upon both a
physical reconnaissance and a map reconnaiss-nce. The map
reconnaissance of the terrain is always performeQ first. Map
reconnaissance consists of the officer studying the features
on a military map in order to select the best routes for his
mission. The officer would then perform an actual .ysical
reconnaissance of these routes in order to select the route
for his unit's actual movement. However, time or security
reasons often preclude a physical reconnaissance so a unit is
sometimes forced to rely on a map reconnaissance alone. An
effective decision aid might greatly assist these officers as
they perform their reconnaissance and select the route for
their unit. This is because it is often difficult to recreate
all the terrain-effects from the military map. For example,
it is sometimes very difficult or time consuming to determine
if the enemy can observe you at a particular position simply
by looking at the topographic information on a map. Also, the
significance of the features on a map change depending on
rainfall and other seasonal factors. These features could
greatly influence the speed of travel on the route. In
addition, even when a physical reconnaissance can be
performed, a decision aid could help to focus the
reconnaissance in a particular area. This could help the
9
leader save time and avoid premature detection while
reconnaissance is being performed.
In his 1989 Master's Thesis [ref 1] CPT Charles Shaw
developed such a: decision aid. His thesis developed a
"psychometric method for determining optimum, tactical paths
for a small unit or vehicle". Briefly, his thesis
demonstrated a methodology for determining an "optimal" route
for a small unit and/or vehicle in a tactical environment.
CPT Shaw's methodology determined its "optimal" path based
upon both the physical effects of terrain and the environment
as well as the cognitive decision making process of the user.-
The physical effects of the terrain and the environment are
available in numerous digital data bases. CPT Shaw's approach
used this data and- psychometric techniques in order to
determine a power function value which is affected by the
specific tactical scenario and the given equipment
configuration. This power function then-provides the means to
determine the tactical movement potential of each Cell.
Tactical movement potential is defined as a subjective
evaluation of relative tactical value of a given point. CPT
Shaw then uses techniques developed by Professor Glen Lindsay
of the Naval Postgraduate School which first translate the
subjective evaluations of the survey into an interval scale
and then into a ratio scale [ref 2:pp 1-21]. Next, he
translates the ratio scale into the same scale as the physical
continuum, time. Finally, the user must evaluate the
3
importance of time or speed. In other words, how far from the
quickest path can the algorithm deviate in order to find the
optimum path? This tactical time evaluation is then combined
with the physical traversal times in order to determine a
single value mapping. The result is then optimized using
Dijkstra's algorithm. This procedure will be discussed- in
detail in Chapter II of this thesis [ref l:pp iii).
One of the sponsor's of CPT Shaw's research, the United
States Army Corps of Engineers Waterway's Experimentation
Station, is carefully considering the fielding of this type of
decision aid throughout the entire Army. This fielding would
mean a large commitment of Army resources including
significant hardware, software, and training costs. Another
potential use of CPT Shaw's algorithm is in the field of high
resolution combat modeling. Currently, most high resolution
models require human input of routes. If CPT Shaw's model
yields routes that are sufficiently similar to "human" routes,
then his model might be used as a surrogate to human/modeler
inputs.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This thesis will explore the effectiveness of CPT Shaw's
decision aid. It will try to determine whether this decision
aid provides combat leaders with a tool which could
significantly help them with route selection. It will
compare and analyze the routes selected by the decision
4
algorithm over the range of possible time input values. It
will also compare the movement routes selected by the
algorithm with unaided routes selected by Army and Marine
officers at the Naval Postgraduate School. The purpose of
this analysis is to give insight into three basic questions:
* Are better routes in the decision aid truly better in a
measurable way? For example, if you relax the time
constraint and hold the other variables constant, is the
resulting route better than or at least equivalent to the
more constrained route?
" In a specific scenario, are the decision aid routes
significantly better than the "unaided" movement routes
chosen by Army and Marine officers stationed at the Naval
Postgraduate School? The answer to this question- is
important because it directly impacts on the procurement
question. If the CAMMS/Shaw routes are better, then the
deployment of such a decision aid could increase the
capabilities of current forces. If it is not measurablybetter, then it does not justify the significant
procurement costs.
" Is the route selected by the model a good surrogate for
officer selected routes? If it is similar,- then it might
be used in combat models.
C. METHODOLOGY
The first step in this study is to choose a procedure or
environment in which to compare the routes. One method might
be a field experiment where actual soldiers are used in the
experiment for both the friendly and the enemy force. The
advantage of this procedure is the obvious realism which lends
credibility to the results. Indeed, the Army's Test and
Experimentation Command often conducts such tests. However,
5
there are several disadvantages to this procedure that
preclude its se]lection for this study. First, this procedure
is expensive because of the costs involved in assembling the
men, equipment and- the training area. In addition, the
stochastic effects of such an experiment would greatly
increase the cost. The increased cost would result because
the variance in the measures of effectiveness due to
individual and unit training levels as well as the combat
itself might be quite large. This variance would necessitate
a number of units and a large number of replications in order
to obtain any reasonable statistical Significance. The cost
would be -prohibitive. As a result, a high resolution combat
model will be used to conduct the study.
There are several combat models available in the Army
inventory which might be used in this study. They include the
Janus(A) model, the Battalion Combat Outcome Model(BCOM), the
Combined Arms and Support Task Force Evaluation Model
(CASTFOREM), and others. The Janus(A) high resolution combat
model was chosen for three reasons. First, it is a high
resolution model that is approved -by the Army Models Board.
Second, CPT Shaw designed his algorithm to -be compatible with
Janus(A) [ref 1: p.41). Finally, it is readily available for
use at the Army's TRADOC Analysis Command at the Naval
Postgraduate School. This model will be discussed in detail
in Appendix A.
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Next, the experiment must be designed and data must be
collected. The first step in the design will be to select
tactical scenarios which- are doctrinally sound and appropriate
for study in both models. Then, the routes from CPT Shaw's
model as well as the officer routes must be obtained. A
survey of officers at the Naval Postgraduate School will be
used to obtain the officer routes. The routes that result
from this officer survey and CPT Shaw's algorithm will then be
input and run in the Janus (A). The resulting casualty figures
from Janus(A)- can then be compared using appropriate measures
of effectiveness (MOEs) and standard statistical and graphical
techniques. The entire design of this experiment is discussed
in detail in Chapter III. The results of this thesis are
discussed in Chapter IV. These results provide Army leaders
a tool for evaluating the potential of CPT Shaw's algorithm.
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II. DFVELOPMENT 0-o THE SHAW-MODEL
A. PREVIOUS ROUTE SELECTION MODELS
1. General
Over the years a number of models have been developed
to predict unit movement. Some of these models are only used
in computer simulations such as the DYNTACS (Dynamic Tactical
Simulation) and STAR -(The Simulation of Tactical Alternative
Responses) models. Other models such as the AM14 (Army Mobility
Management) and the CAMMS -(Condensed Army Mobility Management)
model are actually used by the Army in the field for mobility
predictions, such as vehicle traversal speed and maneuver
damage. A brief discussion of each of these models and its
effect on CPT Shaw's procedure follows.
2. The Dynamic Tactical Simulation Model (DYNTACS)
The DYNTACS model is an extremely high resolution
model that was developed at Ohio State from 1964 to 19-1 [ref
3]. This simulation consists of a driver routine and 34
subroutines. Dynamic Programming is used to determine a unit
route by minimizing the "tactical difficulty" of the route.
The algorithm computes tactical difficulty using a heuristic,
TD = (1 + E)-T. E, the difficulty associated-with each route
segment, is a function of a number of factors along each roate
segment. These factors and their corresponding function
8
values were determined through comparative judgements. T is
the travel time for that route segment which is computed using
engineering models. Shortcomings in this procedure that CPT
Shaw tries to Correct include the elimination of the heuristic
approach and the multiplicative relationship between the
cognitive (E) and the physical (T; scales -[ref i:-p 5-.
3. The Simulation of Tactical Alternative Responses Model
(STAR)
Another model which effected the CPT Shaw algorithm is
the STAR model [ref 1: p.5]. This model eliminated the
dynamic programming solution techniqLe of DYNTACS by using
Dijkstra's algorithm. Dijkstra's al~orithm is a standard
network optimization technique which s lves the single source
shortest path problem. This label setting algorithm works on
all graphs with nonnegative costs (tactical difficulty or
time). The algorithm maintains a set of vertices S whose
optimal path is known. Then, at each step it adds a vertex
whose distance or cost is the shortest possible until the
final vertex is reached [ref.6: pp. '03-2091, However, this
model borrowed the heuristic equation fLi:n DYNTACS, TD = (1
+E)T [ref 4:p.33]. CPT Shaw saw thir. heuristic as a major
shortcoming [ref 1:p 5].
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4. The Condensed Army Mobility Model (CAMMS)
A mobility model provides information on the ability
of vehicles or men to traverse terrain in varying conditions.
Th.is type of model does not cor .. the cognitive factors
which are necessary to desri>:, . unit will move in a
tactical environment. For exam}. j,, a mobility modl could
identify "slow go" terrain, its e],,vat-on, and its vegetation,
but it does integrate all thes- - _tors -with the tactical
situation in order to determine A tactical movement route.
However, this type of model provides an excellent data- base
for a model w..th a goal of building a route selection model.
The CAMMS model is one of the leading mobility models
used today in the Army. The CAMMS model-was derived from the
Army Mobility Model (AMM) which was developed in the late
1970's. The. AMM was a large model developed for use in a
mainframe computer env.ronment. CAMMS was developed for use
on personal computers by using a vehicle preprocessor and
restricting movement to one vehicle av a time. Because it can
be run on a personal computer, it is practical for wide use
in the Army today. This model is used by various agencies
throughout the Army to include the United States Military
Academy, the Training and Doctrine Command,the Army Research
Institute, the United States Army Europe, and others. CPT
Shaw used this model as a key part of his route selection
methodology [ref l:pp 7-9]. His algorithm- is now a subroutine
of the CAMMS model at TRAC-Monterey.
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The CAMMS model uses extremely high resolution terrain
data. Surface elevation, soil composition, and veget1tion data
for 100 meter cells are components of Lhe model's data base.
The model is also capable of evaluating the effect of various
climate conditions on movement so that the seasonal effect of
weather on the terrain can be modeled. This model uses Lhese
data ank information about a specific vehicle to predict the
vehicle's ability to move across the terrain and qe speed of
that movement.
The CAMMS model provides an excellent framework for
the development of this new route selection methodology.
B. COGNITIVE FACTORS EFFECTING ROUTE SELECTION
i. General
CPT Shaw determined a data base (CAMMS) containing the
key physical traits nec-essary for his route selection
algorithm. The next step was to bring the human decision
making process into the equation, a difficult task. In making
their ro.te selections, officers simultaneously consider a
large rumber of variables. CPT Shaw had to decide which
variables werc critical to the decision making process and how
to weight or scale these variables. These weights or scales
then had to be transformed into a single function value.
Next, this function value was related to the physical time
continuum so that a single time value resulted. CPT Shaw
accomplished these tasks using the Generalized Value System
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which was developed by Professor Arthur Schoenstadt at the
Naval Postgraduate School. He also relied heavily on
techniques developed by Professor Glen Lindsay of the Naval
Postgraduate School [ref 2). Basically, these techniques
first transformed subjective evaluations into an interval
scale and subsequently into a :atio scale. Then the ratio
scale data of the tactical variable is translated into a
physical, time scale. Finally, CPT Shaw adds the two time
scales together to obtain a single result. Standard
optimization techniques ari then used to optimize the network.
His procedure for accomplisb.'ng this complex task will -be
discussed in a subsequent i:ection.
2. The Variables
First, CPT Shaw identified the ke,1 variables that he
considered crucial to the decision making process [ref l:p.13-
14]. The variables he identified included the following:
" Mission
" Time Available
0 Equipment and Resources
* Threat Equipment and Capability
* Threat Mission





* Area of Operation or Theater
• Speed or vehicular Agility
-Distance to the Objective
• Obstacles
, Artillery
The next step was to analyze these variables to
determine which variables could be fixed for a given scenario.
These variables could then be eliminated from consideration as
long= as that scenario remained fixed-. Mission, threat
mission, area of operations, equipment and resources
available, threat equipment and- capability were eliminated
using this technique [ref 1: p.14].
CPT Shaw then combined a number of variables into a
new variable he introduced: line -of sight (LOS). This LOS
variable was defined as the number of enemy weapon systems
that could observe a friendly weapon system at a given point.
The variables that directly mapped onto this new variable
included cover, concealment, environment, and range [ref 1:
p14]. He felt that it was the combination of these variables
and their corresponding effect on enemy observation that
influenced route selection. LOS could be easily calculated
using any of a number of standard, existing algorithms [ref
4). Thus, these four variables were eliminated and LOS was
added.
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This techniques was also used to map three other
variables int6 a new variable: localized speed. The effects
of obstacles, environment, and vehicle speed combined to
result in localized speed. Localized speed at a given point
is what is crucial to the decision making- process [ref 1:
p14].
Two of the remaining variables were either transformed
or eliminated. Range to threat was transformed into relative
effective range (RER) to the greatest known threat. RER is a
complicated concept that was developed by Seth-Bonder and Bob
Farrell. Basically, it gives the analyst the capability to
compare different threat capabilities at different ranges. RER
is discussed in detail in CPT Shaw's thesis [ref 1: pp 25-30].
Artillery was eliminated because its impact on movement
decision making- is primarily limited to minefields and
obscurants which fall under environment [ref 1: p 14]. Thus,
two variables, range to threat and artillery, are eliminated
and a new variable, RER is introduced.
This process results in four key variables as long as
the scenario remains fixed:
* Time
* Localized speed
* Relative effective range (RER)
* Number of lines of sight (LOS)
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Finally, the variable, time, is fixed by the user of
the algorithm. The user must determine how much time he is
willing to lose in order to avoid major engagement with the
enemy.
3. The Survey
Next, CPT Shaw surveyed a population of Army and
Marine officers at the Naval Postgraduate School to determine
what these officers felt was the relative importance of the
remaining variables on tactical movement potential (TMP). He
surveyed forty two officers and used multiple regression
techniques to determine equations for TMP. The survey used
five categories to rate the tactical movement potential of
various combinations of LOS, RER, and localized speed [ref 1
pp.43 -60 and p.14]. He used TMP to mean anti-potential,
which meant a large TMP reflected a poor position. He found
two equations satisfactory, one with four variables and the
other with five variables [ref 1: p.21]. The four variable
equation was:
TMP = 118.24 - 0.15(RNG) + 12. (LOS) - 2. (SPD) +
0.2(LOS x SPD)
4. Relating the Physical and Cognitive Scales
The final step of the procedure was to relate the two
scales, the physical scale obtained from CA4MS and the
cognitive scale derived from the TMP regression. The
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cognitive scale was transformed into a physical time scale.
As stated previously, CPT Shaw relied on techniques developed
by Professor Glen Lindsay to-accomplish this task.
After translating the subjective data into an interval
scale, CPT Shaw first determined the minimum and maximum
values of TMP. These are the extreme points of the-cognitive
or interval scale. Fortunately, the survey only identified
two extreme points, one best and one worst case combination.
He used these values to convert the interval scale into a
ratio scale [ref 2: -pp.6-18]. Then he translated the TMP
scale into a time scale. The lowest value of the TbIP became
the origin for the transformation onto the physical time
scale. This point corresponded to adding zero additional time
units to the physical scale. The maximum value (worst
position) or opposite end of the scale was also obtained.
Next, the user or a selected population was surveyed to
determine just how much time they would spend to avoid the
worst possible combination of state variables. This surveyed
time value will subsequently be called the avoidance time.
Then , a (0,1) TMP scale was obtained by dividing the TI"P for
a cell by the maximum TI4P. This scaled TIMP value was then
multiplied through by the given avoidance time value for the
worst possible combination resulting in a translated avoidance
time scale. The scaled cognitive value of "avoidance time
units" is then added to the time value required by the
physical scale (ref. l:pp 21-22]. For example, assume that
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the TMP range was from 5 to 15, and that the officer was
willing to spend 5 minutes to avoid the worst (1-5) cell.
Then, 5 minutes would be added to the traversal time of the 15
TMP cell, 2.5 minutes would be added to the traversal time of
the 10 TMP cell and 0 minutes would be added to the traversal
time of the 5 TMP cell. The procedure used by CPT Shaw
results in a single time value for optimization purposes -[ref
1: pp 21-22 ].
CPT Shaw states this procedure only works if the
maximum and minimum anchor values for TMP can be easily
identified. If these values cannot be Obtained then the
transformation of the cognitive scale onto the physical time
scale cannot be performed.
5. The Optimization
Since the rational minimum and maximum TMP values and
the single time scale had been determined-, CPT Shaw solved the
problem as a shortest path problem with the single time value
as the path length. He used Dijkstra's algorithm which is a
label setting search algorithm [ref 6: pp. 203-209]. The
algorithm simply performs its search on the translated single
time that resulted from the combination of the tactical and
physical traversal times.
The problem can also be solved another way without
resorting to the single time scale technique. CPT Shaw
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discussed this procedure in his thesis, but he did not use
this procedure. In tI case, an optimization involving the
two variables, TMP and-traversal time, is performed. TMP must
be minimized with the added constraint that the path cannot
exceed a maximum allotted time. A standard technique to
perform this optimization is available. This technique is
known as Lagrangian relaxation. Briefly, a Lagrangian
multiplier is used and the objective function becomes:
min [(TMP + LAMBDA x T) x X - LAMBDA x TMAX]
where:
X is a vector of arcs which make up the
network solution.
T is the- physical travel time associated with
each arc.
TMAX is the maximum travel time to traverse the
network.
The problem is to solve for an appropriate value of
LAMBDA between 0 and LAMBrAmax (the maximum traversal time-
multiplied by the number of vertices). The interval between
LAMBDAmin and LAMBDAmax is then narrowed until the appropriate
value is obtained [ref 1: pp.34-35].
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C. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE SHAW PROCEDURE
1. Determing TMP and Traversal Time
The elevenm variables used to compute TMP seem
comprehensive in most respects. By doctrine, the Army officer
considers METT - mission, enemy, troops and time when he
selects a route. CPT Shaw considered all of these ideas in
his eleven variables. However, it is important to note that
many of these variables are "fixed" by the scenario.
Therefore the TMP function derived from the officer survey is
only valid as long as those variables remain fixed. This fact
requires that a number of TMP functions must be developed to
cover each combination of the fixed variables. In addition,
the CAMMS model is an excellent selection to provide
environmental data and calculate traversal times. This part
of the methodology is well founded.
2. The Single Time Solution Technique
The single time solution technique used in the final
step of CPT Shaw's procedure which combines TMP and traversal
time into a single value was discussed with Professors Parry
and Lindsay of the Naval Postgraduate School. After the
consultation, the author concluded that the technique has some
limitations. First, CPT Shaw assumed that the avoidance time
function is linear between the maximum and the minimum values
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as he only obtained from the user the avoidance time for the
worst case TMP and he assigned a value of 0 to the best case
TMP. The true user avoidance time function for values between
these points may not be linear. The user avoidance function
must be determined by surveying the user over a larger number
of the remaining state variables. However, ever, if this
function was obtained the avoidance time and traversal time
scales could not be added. Adding these values, avoidance
time (a function of TMP), and traversal time is actually a
hueristic weighting technique and not a true optimal solution
technique. Thus, the Lagrangian relaxation technique which
determines the best TMP route for the available time should be
considered.
Another potential problem with combining TMP and
traversal time onto a single scale is that they are not
independent. The TMP value is a function of LOS, speed, and
RER. The traversal time is a function of speed. Thus, the
two values, TMP and; traversal time are both functions of
speed. When the variables in the TMP function are weighted
with the avoidance time, you obviously do not change the
traversal speed. However, the relative importance of speed is
changed in the overall optimization. The TMP speed (as well
as the other TMP variables in the multiple regression) is
multiplied by a constant (Avoidance Time/TMPmax) in -order to
transform TMP into the physical scale. This value is then
added to the traversal time, a pure function of the traversal
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speed. The effect on the optimization may be that the true
importance of speed could be changed. Perhaps, only certain
avoidance time ranges might be effective due to Changes in
the relative importance of speed. In any case, this effect is
another argument for the Lagrangian relaxation technique.
A final potential problem with the single time
solution technique is the human factor. One could expect
large differences between the avoidance times (for the worst
possible TMP cell) and the traversal times. For example if
the avoidance time for a worst cell (which the user inputs
into the model) was 200 minutes, the actual movement time may
take much less than 200 minutes. This was shown byexamining
the route in Janus(A) and in the CAMMS speed map feature. The
difference between the times in itself is not surprising and
is wholly consistent with the model. The cell traversal times
and not the single, combined time value determine the complete
route traversal time. In other words, the tactical time units
that are added for optimization purposes do not affect the
actual traversal time. The actual traversal time remains a
function of the physical effects of the environment. Howeverf
the difference between the times will confuse the typical Army
user who will approach the problem with the idea of selecting
the best route for a given traversal time. He will probably
interpret the avoidance time as the network traversal time;
The Army officer would better understand the Lagrangian
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relaxation solution where the best route for the available
time is obtained.
This human problem could also be lessened if the
CAMMS/Shaw model displayed the expected traversal time of the
network. The user would then know how much time he would
probably spend crossing the terrain network. If he had more
actual time than predicted by the model, he could then select
a higher avoidance time.
3. Defining the Area of Operation
Another problem with the algorithm involves selecting
the area of operation. When a new -area of operations is
selected, the Dijkstra Search fails and an error message is
given approximately 90 percent of the time. However, if one
repeatedly inputs the area of operation, the search will
eventually function successfully. The problem is probably
occurring due to the network crossing the boundary of the area
of operations. This problem could -be solved by preprocessing
the edges that cross the boundary and assigning them -an
extremely large value. The Dijkstra search would then avoid
these edges. The problem could also stem from an error in the
model's code. In any case, the problem needs to be corrected.
4. Sensitivity Analysis
The CAMMS/Shaw model was used to select routes in two
areas of operation under the scenarios described in Chapter
22
III and Appendix -B. Time -was varied from -0 minutes- to- 360
minutes to avoid the worst cell in ten minute increments.
Where large variations occurred in this ten minute interval
the time value was varied every minute. The behavior of the
model for several avoidance times is recorded in Figures 1 to
12 of Appendix D.
The model never reaches one recommended route as it
oscillates from routes on the left side to routes on the
right side of the area of operation. Even at avoidance times
well over 100 minutes for a 4000 meter movement, the model
selects routes that differ dramatically. Often, these routes
are only slightly different than routes it had selected
earlier. This oscillation does not imply that the algorithm
is functioning improperly. The avoidance time affects every
cell in the network by weighting the TMP factor more heavily.
Thus, radical shifts are possible and even likely. However,
these shifts could serve to confuse users on the meaning and
effectiveness of these routes.
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III. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIKENT
A. GENERAL
The design of the experiment must remain focussed on two
things: the purpose of the thesis and the capabilities of the
Shaw and Janus(A) models. All design decisions are based on
these two points.
B. THE SIZE OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCES
Before the scenario can -be developed, the size of the
respective forces must be decided. The key factor in
determining both force sizes is the attacking force. This is
because the defender to attacker ratio is normally three to
one by Army doctrine. So the question becomes how large
should the attacking force be?
The attacking force is the force that will follow the
routes prescribed by the officers and CPT Shaw's model. Since
the officers can select routes for units of any size, CPT
Shaw's model becomes the determining factor in selecting the
size of the attacking force. CPT Shaw developed his model to
select a route for a single vehicle or a small unit. This
single route would then be used to model the movement of the
entire unit. Because larger units often move over multiple
routes, the smallest possible attacking force should be selected.
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Two attacking- force sizes were considered: a platoon, with
four weapon systems, and a company, with 14 -weapon systems.
The company normally consists of three platoons and a company
headquarters. One advantage of a platoon sized force is that
a platoon nearly always moves along one route. Companies on
the other hand sometimes use multiple routes to deploy their
platoons to the objective.
The platoon sized force was not selected for two reasons.
The first reason is the-purpose of this thesis. Independent
platoon scenarios in raids or rear battle situations or even
some deliberate attacks could be developed. However, these
limited scenarios would not reflect most offensive scenarios.
As a result, analysis based on these limited scenarios would
have little relevance to the vast majority of offensive
operations. Therefore, the questions regarding the
appropriateness of the model to the Army as a whole could not
be addressed. The second -reason is that a platoon rarely
moves along a separate route independent of the other platoons
in the company. Thus, the platoon route would be influenced
by the dispositions of friendly forces. The dispositions of
friendly forces are not considered in CPT Shaw's model. These
facts make a platoon force inappropriate for consideration.
The company sized force was selected because it is the
smallest force that normally operates independently of the
rest of the force inside its area of operation. Independence
does not mean that the company is not integrated into the
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battle plan by its higher headquarters. The company's area of
Operation and objective are assigned by its -higher
headquarters,. However, inside that assigned% area of
operations the company is free to maneuver to its objective as
it chooses. Since a company attacking force was selected, the
size of the defending force was also fixed by the three to one
rule. A platoon consisting of four weapon systems would be
the defense.
Two assumptions about the company's movement have to be
made. First, the company movement is restricted to one route.
Second, it must move over that route in a prescribed
formation.
C. THE PLACE OF THE BATTLE-
The Lauterbach area of West Germany was selected as the
place of the battle for three reasons. First, the CAMMS/Shaw
model located at TRAC - Monterey only has a terrain base built
for the Lauterbach area. Terrain Data for another area would
have to be imported. Also, the multiple regression equation
for the TMP value obtained from the officer L urvey was based
on the Lauterbach area. This equation may not apply to other
areas. Finally, the Lauterbach area is suitable because it is
an area in West Germany that figures prominently in many Army
scenarios.
26
D. THE POSITION OF THE FORCES
Selection of the defensive positions was made using a map
reconnaissance and the Janus(A) model. The map reconnaissance
was made to generally select a number of appropriate defensive
areas of operation. Then, the Janus (A)- model was used to make
the final selection because of the LOS feature of the model
which allows the model user to graphically determine what a
weapon system can see at a given point on the battlefield.
This feature of Janus(A) is critical to position selection
because positions with a poor LOS in the Janus(A) model would
not be able to observe the approaching enemy. Thus, the
defenders would not be able to engage the enemy over most of
the area of operation. As a result, there would be few
casualties generated and very little difference between the
routes. After careful study, two positions were finally
selected. The positions selected are shown on overlays in
Appendix B. Two positions were selected so that results in
different environments could be examined. A larger number was
not feasible due to time constraints.
Position one is located at the military crest of a small
hill overlooking a town and a large open area. This position
is quite dominating as it has LOS over a good portion of the
area of operations. This position will defend an attack from
the assembly area to the east as shown in overlay one.
Position two is located just below the military crest of
a large hill overlooking a city and a wooded area. This
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position has LOS over a more limited amount of the area of
operations. Thus, there is more dead space for weapon system
movement in this area of operation. This- position will defend
an attack fr~m the south. Company assembly areas for the
attacking force were selected just outside-of the range of the
defenders' direct fire weapons, approximately 4500 meters from
the objective.
Great care was taken so that the precise locations of the
individual weapon system's defensive positions in the Janus(A)
model, the CAMMS/Shaw model, and the officer survey were the
same.
E. THE SCENARIO
The tactical scenario is also enclosed in Appendix B. The
general enemy and friendly situation is similar to the
situation used in CPT Shaw's survey so that the TMP multiple
regression equation would apply. The same-general situation
applies to each area of operations. The unit mission is a
deliberate attack from a company assembly area to a prepared
defensive position. Each of the officer respondents and the
CAMMS/Shaw model were required to select routes from the
company assembly to the objective under different time
scenarios in each of the two areas of operation.
The time conditions are that they should move to the
objective:
* as fast as possible
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* while spending up to 30 minutes in order to avoid major
conflict before the objective
without regard to time (best route).
Since this task must be accomplished for each of the two areas
of operation, this means that six routes must be selected by
each respondent.
F. OFFICER ROUTES
Officer routes were obtained by individually surveying
selected officers "in person". The "in person" survey
technique was used because time tests demonstrated that the
survey required nearly an -hour to complete. This time was
greatly reduced by developing map boards with the overlays
already attached to them and briefing the officer. This
technique reduced the time required for the respondent to
complete the survey to approximately fifteen minutes. Ten
officers selected from a class at the Naval Postgraduate
School were chosen to complete the survey. The prime
limiting factor on the number of officers was time using
Janus(A) as each of these officers was selecting six routes
and each route required thirty replications of a scenario
using this model.
G. CAM!S/SHAW ROUTES
In addition, six routes were selected from the
sensitivity analysis that was performed on the CAMMSJShaw
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model. The 0,30, and maximum minute avoidance time routes
were selected so that these routes could be compared to the
officer selections. Three other routes were also selected
based on the type of approach selected so that different
approaches could be examined. For example, if a left side
approach was already selected then a right side approach was
selected. This selection method was used because of the
limited number of routes that could be run in the Janus(A)
model. Different approach routes would provide greater
insight into the CA14MS/Shaw -model performance than routes that
were nearly the same.
H. THE JANUS(A) MODEL
The next step was to build the appropriate scenario in the
Janus(A) model. The procedure for building this scenario is
discussed in detail in Appendix A.
The routes obtained from the officers and the CA&R.IS model
were then input into Janus-(A). The routes are input by
selecting a number of movement nodes to model piecewise linear
sections of the route. The weapon systems then move in a
straight line from node to node until they have completed
their route. When the friendly weapon system reaches the
attack position at the base of the objective (approximately
200 meters away from threat weapon systems), the battle is
terminated. This termination condition was chosen because the
study is not interested in the results of these extremely
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close engagements, but rather the impact of the route. Each
of these routes were run systemically thirty times on the
Janus(A) model. This replication was necessary to determine
the variance and distribution of the casualty figures due to
the Janus(A) model's stochastic nature.
I. FORMATIONS
A final step was to choose the formation that the attacker
would use on his route. Three formations were considered:
* an individual weapon system column formation where the
weapon systems would move in a column formation throughout
the route.
* the Janus(A) default unit formation where units move in a
column formation- until they acquire the enemy. Then the
weapon systems move on-line to fire [ref 7: pp 12-14).
* an on-line formation where the weapon systems moved on
line in a very tight formation throughout the route.
The different formations were tested in the Janus(A) model
on some of the base case scenarios. Different results were
obtained with each of the different formations. The Janus(A)
unit default formation was chosen for two reasons. First,
this formation gave the unit the ability to move on line when
it engaged the enemy. Also, this formation's model run time
was much quicker than the other formations model run time.
Speed was important because of the large number of model runs
required.
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J. DATA COLLECTION AND-REDUCTION
After each run red and blue casualty figures at each of
five range breaks were recorded. The range breaks (in meters)
were:
* 0 to 1000
1 000 to 1500
* 1500 to 2000
* 2000 to 2500
* beyond 2500
The data had to be manually down loaded from the Janus(A)
model due to hardware problems that resulted from an upgrade
of the system at TRAC-Monterey. The database was then




The following table summarizes the experiment using
Janus (A)
NUMBER OF ROUTES PER RUNS PER TOTAL RUNS
SUBJECTS SUBJECT ROUTE
OFFICERS 10 6 30 2160
CAMMS/ 1 12 30 360
SHAW
TYPE OF 3 5 30 450
FORMATION
TOTAL 2970
The simulation results of the CAMMS/Shaw routes at the
different avoidance times were compared to determine if routes
with larger avoidance times are more effective. This would
help to answer the second thesis question: Are better routes
in the decision aid truly better? The simulation results of
the CAMMS/Shaw routes and the officers were also compared to
determine how CAMMS performs in relation to active duty
officers.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)
The number of blue kills was chosen as the measure of
effectiveness for this study. This is a direct measure of the
survivability of the route. The possible range of this MOE is
from 0 to 14, as the blue company consisted of 14 weapon
systems. Obviously, if no blue weapon systems were destroyed,
the route was very effective (survivable). Conversely, if 14
vehicles were destroyed, the route was-poor.
The number of red kills was not chosen as an MOE because
of the insignificant number of red killed in the simulation.
Nearly 80 percent of the routes resulted in no red kills in
the 30 model runs. The other routes -resulted in between 0 and
0.23 kills per run. This low number of kills probably
occurred because red systems were inhull-defilade positions.
Thus, blue systems rarely detected, observed-, or fired- at
them. The low number of red kills was insignificant in
comparison to the number of blue kills (see Appendix C).
The number of blue kills was examined over two range
intervals. The first interval was the entire route. The data
for the entire route were examined because they obviously
evaluate the entire route. The second interval was the route
up to a point 1000 meters from the -nearest red system. The
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second interval was chosen because units often begin deploying
their platoons on-line and begin fighting the close-in battle
at this point. While deploying on-line and into assault
positions , units often deviate from the one prescribed route,
thus violating a key assumption. This violation could make
evaluation of data in the last range band (0 to 1000 meters)
suspect. Differences in the measure of effectiveness between
the routes are evaluated using nonparametric techniques.
Nonparametric techniques are used because the normality
assumption required for standard ANOVA is violated.
Specifically, the Kruskal-Wallis test of equal medians is used
to evaluate differences. This test does not -assume a normal
blue killed distribution. This test is discussed in detail in
Nonparametric Methods of Quantative Analysis by Gibbons [ref
8: pp 173-181].
The reader should note that the "blue killed" axis on all
graphical portrayals of the MOE ranges from 0 (the minimum) to
14 (the maximum) on all figures, which facilitates direct
comparison between different figures.
B. COMPARING MODEL GENERATED ROUTES
1. Entire Route
Figures 1 and 2 show box plots of the CAMMS/Shaw
results for the complete route in the north-south and east-
west attacks, respectively. These results and all other
results are tabulated in Appendix C. In both attacks the
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number of blue casualties initially decreases as one would
expect if the CAMMSiShaw model was completely ;consistent.
However, in the east-west attack blue casualty figures for
routes with avoidance times of 90, 200, and 300 minutes are
higher than earlier routes. These casualty figures are
statistically different at p-values much less than 0.01.
Also, in the north-south attack the means of the casualty
distributions for routes with avoidance times of 200 and 300
minutes are statistically less effective than routes with
earlier avoidance times at p-values of less than 0.0001 (200)
and 0.01 (300). Thus, this study found an inconsistency when
comparing the complete CAMMS/Shaw routes with certain
avoidance times against each other.
2. Route Up To 1000 Meters
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of the CAMMS/Shaw
route up to the 1000 meter mark. Once again, although the
casualty figures initially decrease, routes at greater
avoidance time values yield casualty distributions that are
statistically worse than routes for earlier time values. In
the north-south attack the lowest casualty distributions occur
at routes with avoidance times of 30 and 60 minutes. Indeed,
the 30 minute avoidance time routes never experiences a single
blue casualty up to the 1000 meter mark. However, the
casualty distributions for routes with avoidance times of
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200, 300 and 330-minutes are statistically less effective than
the 30 minute route with p values below 0.001.
3. Traversal Times
The traversal times of the different CAM4S/Shaw routes
are depicted in Figure 5. These traversal times were
determined in the base case scenario. The traversal times
cannot be determined in systemic Janus (A). Thus, only one
value is plotted for each avoidance time. If the CAMMS/Shaw
and the Janus models were completely compatible and accuratei
travel time would never decrease as avoidance time increases.
However, the chart shows that this relationship does not
exist. Several routes with higher avoidance times take less
time than earlier routes.
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The inconsistent traversal time result is rot
surprising due to the fact that Janus-(A) does not possess the
detailed terrain data that is present in the CAMMS/ShaW model
[ref 1:pp 7-8 and ref 103. Therefore, it would only be a
chance occurrence if the travel time always increased as
avoidance time increased. This is especially true since the
traversal time range difference in both scenarios is only 16
minutes. Only the 300 minute avoidance time route in the
north-south scenario, which travels completely around the
defensive position, is outside of this range. However,
Janus(A) is-not designed to predict traversal times. This is
the function of a mobility model such as CAMMS. Therefore,
this result alone does not invalidate the analysis.
This study also found that some routes that were
judged as better by the CAMMS/Shaw model were judged as less
effective by Janus(A). Janus(A), as an Army Models Board
approved high resolution combat model, is designed to predict
the battle calculus of combat. Therefore, this result is more
troublesome because it means that the CAMMS/Shaw model is
somewhat inconsistent with respect to the battle calculus that
Janus(A) is supposed to predict. However, before one can
conclude that there are problems with the CAMMS/Shaw
algorithm, the possible causes of the discrepancy must be
examined.
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The first cause could be differences in the terrain
representations between the two models. As stated earlier the
CAMMS/Shaw model -has a much more detailed terrain
representation than does the Janus (A) model. These
differences between the terrain models could explain LOS and
speed differences between the models. LOS and speed are two
of the three variables in the TMP regression function so
naturally these could affect TMP and cause the discrepancy.
The terrain differences between the models were also pointed
out by the differences in the traversal time predictions. The
traversal times as evaluated by Janus(A) were different than
the traversal times predicted by CA1414S.-
A second possible cause is that the algorithms inside
Janus(A) may not accurately simulate combat which means that
Janus(A) is not effective enough as a combat model to evaluate
the routes. This would result in inaccurate casualty figures
which would invalidate all results.
Another cause may be that the TI.P regression function
is flawed in some way. If TMP were flawed, the result would
be inaccurate evaluations of the TMP of the various cells. As
a result, the route recommended by the CA4MS/Shaw model would
be based upon inaccurate data. This problem could be
addressed by performing another officer TMP survey with a
different population. Any of these three possible causes or
a combination of them could cause the problems that were
discovered during this study.
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A third cause could be that the avoidance time may be
limited to certain range values. This result could possibly
be due to the fact that both traversal time and TMP are
functions of speed. Perhaps, the avoidance time might anly be
valid from 0 to less than 60 minutes, which would be
consistent with the results achieved in this study, since
avoidance time decreased initially in both scenarios.
However, a much larger number of routes at various avoidance
times would have to be evaluated to determine if a valid
avoidance time range exists.
A final cause may be that the heuristic single time
solution technique may not be accurate enough. If this were
the case, then a different optimization, such as the
Lagrangian relaxation would be required.
To attempt to determine which of the five possible
causes actually resulted in the discrepancy is beyond the
scope of this study. However, several studies could be
undertaken to try to provide insight into this problem. Some
of these studies are discussed in Chapter Five.
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C. CAMMS/SHAW VS. ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS
1. Entire Route
The complete route mean blue killed distributions for
the 10 officers at the 3 avoidance times are shown in Figures
6 and 7. There are no statistical differences between the
means of the three distributions in the north-south or the
east-west attack at any reasonable p-value level.
In the north-south attack at 0, 30 and maximum minute
avoidance times the officer mean blue kills were 9.2, 9.4 and
8.96, respectively. This compares with CAMMS/Shaw means of
8.1, 4.7 and 5.7 blue kills per run. CAMMS/Shaw routes are
significantly better than the officer routes with p values of
0.07 (0), and less than -0.0001 for the 30 minute, and maximum
avoidance time cases.
In east-west attack at avoidance times of 0, 30, and
maximum minutes the officer mean blue kills were 6.21, 6.3,
and 6.5 compared with CAMMS/Shaw means of 11.1, 7.9,and 10.2,
respectively. The CAMMS/Shaw model routes are significantly
b!jos effective than the officer routes in the 0 minute and
maximum avoidance times cases with p-values of less than
0.001. There is no significant difference at the 0.05
significance level between the 30 minute avoidance time
routes. The p-value is 0.11.
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2. The Route Up To 1000 Meters
The officer mean blue killed distributions at the
different avoidance times for routes up to 1000 meters from
the objective are depicted in Figures 8 and 9. Once again,
there are no statistically significant differences between the
effectiveness of the three officer routes at any reasonable
level of significance.
In the east-west attack, the overall officer means for
the 0,30, and maximum avoidance times are 5.96, 5.97, and
6.02, respectively. The CAMMS/Shaw means for 0,30, and
maximum avoidance times are 11.1, 7.9, and 10.02 respectively.
The CAMMS/Shaw route is significantly less effective than
officer's routes at p-value levels of less than 0.0001 in the
0 and maximum minute cases and 0.04 in the thirty minute case.
In the north-south attack the overall officer means
for the 0,30, and maximum minute avoidance time cases are
5.88, 6.16, and 4.84, respectively. The CAMMS/Shaw means were
7.2, 0, and 5.1. The CAMMS/Shaw model performed better
significantly better than officers in the 30 minute case with
a p-value of less than 0.0001. CAMMS/Shaw also performed
better in the 0 minute case with a p-value of 0.10. There was
no significant difference between the model and the officers
in the maximum case at any reasonable significance level.
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3. Traversal Times
The traversal times for the officers are depicted in
Figure 10. There is no significant differences between the
means of the distributions in the north-south or east-west
routes. However, as stated earlier Janus(A) should not be








































The CAMMS/Shaw model performed well against the
officers in the north-south attack. The model performed
especially well in the 30 minute avoidance time route where
the CAMMS/Shaw model route did not result in a single casualty
up to 1000 meters. This suggests that the -model may have some
promise. The north-south scenario is in an area where there
is a considerable amount of vegetation and contour differences
in the terrain. Thus, route selection in this area is
especially important as there are covered and concealed routes
available. CAMMS/Shaw found: these routes better than the
officers in this study.
The CAMMS/Shaw model did not perform as well as the
officers in the east-west attack. Any of the-possible causes
previously discussed could have resulted in the -performance
differences of the CAMMS/Shaw model in the east-west attack.
However, in this case one additional explanation of the
problem is suggested. The discrepancy could also be explained
by the nature of the two scenarios. As stated earlier, the
north-south terrain is much more covered and concealed with
some rolling forested areas than is the east-west terrain.
The east-west terrain is very open with few good routes
available. The only cover available is primarily limited to
the urban areas and Janus(A) portrays urban areas only in
terms of their density (ref 10]. The officers may have
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performed better because they made greater use of this urban
cover and concealment. Perhaps, the particular TMP function
used in this CAMMS/Shaw model does not evaluate urban areas
effectively.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS
The CAMMS/Shaw model could° not predict effective routes
throughout the range of avoidance times using the single time
solution technique and the present TMP function. Additional
studies should be performed to determine if the CAMMS/Shaw
model is effective over a more limited range of avoidance time
values and to validate the TMP function. This study produced-
some evidence that- the CAMMS/Shaw model was valid for
avoidance times-below 60 minutes.
The CAMMS/Shaw model was significantly more effective than
officers in predicting routes in the north-south scenario. In-
addition, this attack scenario contained more available cover
and concealment than the other scenario. This result
indicates that when cover is available, CAMMS/Shaw -may provide
officers with an effective tool for evaluating tactical
routes.
The CAMMS/Shaw model did not select routes as well as
officers in the east-west attack scenario. This problem could
have been caused by a number of factors to include the nature
of the scenario. The east-west scenario had very little cover
outside of the urban areas and Janus(A) only grossly portrays
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urban areas. Officers used this urban cover and concealment
better than the CAMMS/Shaw model.
Modelers should consider replacing the single time
heuristic solution procedure with the Lagrangian relaxation
optimization technique. The Lagrangian technique is easier to
understand, because it selects the best route for the
traversal time available. This procedure avoids the concept
of avoidance time neccesary in the single time scale heuristic
which could cause confusion and possibly inaccurate results.
The problem in the model with defining the area of
operations discussed in Chapter II should be identified and
solved. Presently, the user can only define the area of
operation after numerous trials. The function fails and an
error message is generated approximately 90 percent of the
time.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The effectiveness of CAMMS/Shaw model routes over
different avoidance time ranges should be evaluated
independent of the performance of officers. This study only
evaluated a total of 12 CAMIS/Shaw routes due to the
requirement to evaluate officer routes. Concentrating on
CAMMS/Shaw routes will allow a larger number of routes to be
evaluated. This larger sample size will give a better picture
of the CAMMS/Shaw model using the single time heuristic
solution technique over the range of avoidance times. initial
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studies should focus on routes with avoidance times from 0 to
60 minutes.
Similar studies comparing CAMMS/Shaw against officers in
different scenarios should also be considered. These
comparisons will provide a larger sample size which could
provide more statistical evidence to evaluate the possible
effectiveness of the CAMMS/Shaw model as a decision aid. This
study could only evaluate two scenarios. A much larger number
of scenarios should be evaluated before an informed decision
can be made.
The TMP regression should be reexamined with a different
population to determine if a similar regression function is
obtained. The survey should be done in a more controlled
environment such as a TRADOC school. CPT Shaw had to depend
on the good nature of graduate students who responded through
the mail. Although every effort was made to effectively
administer this survey, these officers may not have taken
sufficient time to properly respond to all questions.
The CAMMS/Shaw model at TRAC-Monterey does not contain a
module which displayed the traversal time as predicted by
CAIMS. A version of the CAMS/Shaw model which contains this
module should be obtained. Then, the routes at the different
avoidance times and their predicted traversal times could be
compared. The comparison could determine whether the
CA4MS/Shaw model traversal times decrease as avoidance time
increased. This comparison would be a direct test of the
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algorithm independent of another model. If the CAMMS model
predicted that routes with higher avoidance times were faster
* than routes with lower avoidance times,- then one could
conclude that Lh ?r'-, 4hm is definitely faulty. This
conclusion would be necessary because CAMMS is the data source
of the CAMMS/Shaw model for traversal speed.
This study used the default unit formation of Janus(A).
similar studies could also be performed with other unit
formations. In addition, other high resolution combat models
could be used.
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APPENDIX A. THE JANUS(A) MODEL
A. GENERAL
Before any comparisons of routes can be accomplished, the
model that simulates the combat must be understood. This
understanding is important, because every model is only an
abstraction of reality. Therefore, the results are -only
valid within the framework of the model assumptions. This
appendix explains some of the key features and abstractions of
the Janus(A) combat model that were used in building the
scenario.
The Janus(A) model consists of approximately 85,000 lines
of FORTRAN source code. It was developed for the Army by
Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California. The chief Army
proponent for the model is the Training and Doctrine Command
Analysis Center at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The
model is approved by the Army Models Board and is widely used
to conduct studies on a variety of Army problems.
The particular model used for this study runs on a VAX/VMS
system at TRAC - Monterey. The user interacts with a keyboard
and a black and white monitor to communicate scenario building
selections and changes to the model.
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The Janus(A) model has two modes: systemic processing and
man-in-the-loop (normal). The systemic processing mode is
used after a base case scenario is developed by the modeler.
The modeler uses systemic processing because of the stochastic
nature of Janus(A) and because of the relative speed of
systemic processing. The stochastic nature of the model
requires multiple repetitions (normally 30-40) in order to
determine the variance in the results. Systemic processing
can complete these 30 to 40 runs much faster than the normal
mode. The main reason for the relative speed is that the
systemic mode does not display the battle graphically. In the
systemic processing mode only casualty figures and related
data are displayed on the screen. The normal mode, on the
other hand, graphically displays the weapon systems as they
maneuver on the terrain. The normal mode is used to build a
base case scenario and for interactive combat modeling. The
base case scenario includes the weapon systems, routes,
obstacles, and many other features that are used to simulate
combat. The interactive feature allows a user to change
inputs, such as routes, at any time in the battle. In the
normal mode an additional color monitor with high resolution
graphics is used. The color monitor displays the forces as
they employ fire and maneuver on the battlefield. Separate
monitors for red and blue forces are used. The red force
monitor only displays the red deployment and the blue forces
that the red force can observe. The blue monitor displays
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similar graphics for blue. Engagements as-well as kills are-
also displayed on- the screen [ref 11 -pp:9-16]. The entire
hardware configuration is shown in Figure 11.
Graphics Monitor il~ ~Grahc M Ito
f ,
*ideo Montorafl.
01 Blue Side"! ~ .Re
Figure 11 The Janus (A) hardware configuration.
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B. BUILDING WEAPON SYSTEMS
Weapon systems in Janus (A) consist of specified number of
individual weapons grouped together to build the system. For
example, a tank weapon system might consist of the main gun,
an M-60 machinegun and a coaxial .50 cal machinegun. Each of
these weapon systems would have various probability of hit,
and probability of kill/hit tables as functions of range
associated with it. The tables would correspond to the
various modes of engagement between two weapon systems. For
example, one mode of engagement might be a stationary tank in
defilade engaging a moving exposed tank on its flank with its
main gun. Thus, a weapon system might have a large number of
probability tables associated with it. In addition some
weapons cannot engage other weapons at all. The three weapon
systems used in this study were built using the Army Material
Scientific Support Agency (AMSSA) data base.
C. BUILDING UNITS
Units are built using the Forces Editor. The user builds
a force using the weapon systems that he has already created.
The force may contain any combination of the previously
designated weapon systems. The force can be built using
single or aggregated weapon systems. A force containing ten
single weapon systems would display each weapon system on the
Janus(A) screen. Each of these weapon systems would- require
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a separate route designated for it. A force containing an
aggregated unit with ten weapon systems requires display of
only a single weapon system on the Janus(A) screen. This
aggregated weapon system would require only a single route
designated for the entire unit. The weapon systems in the
unit move on that route in a column formation until they are
firing on the enemy. Theno, the unit deploys into an on-line
formation. Aggregated units may contain up to 15 weapon
systems [ref 10].
D. TERRAIN
Terrain in Janus(A) is not as detailed as the terrain in
the CAMMS model. Janus(A) terrain consists only of elevation
and vegetation/urban density data for 100 meter cells [ref.
10]. This could become a limitation when evaluating the CAMMS
model with Janus(A). Janus(A) may not be able to resolve
subtle differences between different pieces of terrain that
result from soil or climate conditions.
Terrain affects a host of functions in the model from unit
movement to target acquisition. The effects on the major
sections are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
E. FIRE CONTROL
The NVEOL Acquisition Model is a key module used in
Janus(A). This model controls an LOS module which uses the
elevation and vegetation data to calculate whether LOS exists
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between the observer and his target. This LOS is updated
every six seconds. Once LOS is obtained, the cumulative
probability of acquisition is computed at fixed time intervals
until acquisition occurs. Then, the weapon system appears on
the unit's target list where it can be engaged. The
engagement takes place based on the priority of the target and
the capabilities of the acquiring weapon system. If a target
is available and the acquiring weapon system has ammunition,
the acquiring system will normally engage the target unless a
fire discipline feature is used [ref 7: pp 23-40].
Fire discipline can be modeled in two ways. First, range
priorities can be set by weapon and ammunition type while
building the scenario. Also, in the interactive mode, weapons
can be placed in a hold fire status making it impossible to
fire. However, neither of these fire discipline measures were
used because they would create another variable (opponent fire
discipline strategy) which would have to be studied
separately.
F. MANEUVER ROUTES
Maneuver in Janus(A) begins when a unit is deployed using
the interactive version of the model. A mouse is used to
select the exact position a unit will be deployed on the
graphical terrain representation. Then, the unit's
individually prescribed route is input into the model until
the plan is complete. All routes in Janus(A) are piecewise
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linear. The route is input by selecting a number of
sequential points anywhere in the terrain grid. The weapon
system then moves in a straight line from -point to point until
it completes its route.
Once the plan is complete and the simulation begins, the
unit moves at a speed determined by three conditions. The
three conditions are the maximum assigned speed of vehicle
itself, the maximum assigned speed of the unit to which the
vehicle is attached (the group speed)i, and the terrain
conditions. The terrain affects movement speed based on the
terrain slope and the density of vegetation/urban areas. The
minimum of these three speeds determines the rate of movement
[ref 11: pp 55-69].
G. OTHER EFFECTS
There are a host of other effects in the model that are
not discussed here. These effects include suppression,
nuclear fires, artillery, engineering obstacles, and the
mission oriented protective posture (MOPP)- employed to combat
nuclear,biological and chemical fires. More detailed
information on these effects and the other features already
discussed can be obtained from the various Janus(A) references
listed in the bibliography.
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H. BUILDING A BASE CASE SCENARIO AND SYSTEMIC-JANUS(A)
The next step is to build a base case scenario. The
purpose of this procedure is to verify the simulated battle
before beginning systemic processing. An essential step in
building this base case scenario is weapon system verification
to ensure that correct weapon systems exist and that proper
relationships between the weapon systems exist. Janus (A) has
several features to help in weapon system verification. One
such feature graphically displays the relationships that exist
between weapon systems so that problems can be easily
identified. The next step is to observe the ensuing battle on
the interactive screen to insure that the battle unfolds
properly. Any inconsistencies or unusual occurrences, such as
weapon systems not firing, indicate problems with model data
inputs. These problems must be corrected before proceeding
with systemic processing. In addition, battle termination
conditions are also important. For example, if the battle
last too long weapon systems may run out of ammunition or the
entire force may be killed on every run, thus biasing the
results. On the other hand, if the battle is to short, key
data may be lost. A base case scenario must be run for every
route entered before systemic processing begins.
Once the base case scenario is properly built and the
battle termination conditions (time) have been determined, the
user may proceed with systemic processing. Systemic
processing is necessary because of the stochastic nature of
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Janus (A). Systemic processing runs much faster than normal
model runs as no graphics are required. Only casualty reports
and related information are-generated.
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APPENDIX B. OFFICER TACTICAL ROUTE SURVEY
TACTICAL ROUTE SURVEY
The purpose of this survey is to evaluate a tactical route
decision aid that the Army may provide to tactical commanders
in the future. The decision-aid is designed to-determine an
"optimal" tactical route between two points on a battlefield.
I am asking your help to assist me in determining whether this
tool is a good investment for the Army. You will be asked to
select routes for a heavy company / team- in two offensive
scenarios. The routes will be from a company assembly area to
an assault position. The scenarios are simple and the entire
survey should take no more than twenty minutes.
Your routes, the routes of other Army and Marine officers,
and the routes determined by the decision aid will then be
input into the Janus(A) combat simulation to provide a
comparison based on combat results. I will use several
different measures of effectiveness to make the comparison.
The basic question I am trying to answer is whether the
decision aid can perform better than experienced Army and
Marine officers such as yourself.
I will also ask you to provide me some simple background
information on your career experiences. However, I assure you
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that your survey results will remain confidential and that
only general results will be reported in my thesis. I would
also request that you return the survey in the envelope
provided no later than 1 July 90 so that your results can be
included in my thesis.
I want to thank you in advance for your assistance and







PART ONE -BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Please circle the correct response or fill in the blank.
1. I am a Marine / Army officer.
2. My paygrade is 0-1 / O-2 / 0-3 / 0-4 / 0-5.
3. I have served in combat arms tactical units for
years and months.
4. I was a platoon leader for years and
months.
5. I served -on a battalion staff for years and
months.
6. I served as a company commander for years and
months.
7. My basic branch is _ _
8. I have completed years and months of
commissioned service.
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PART TWO - GENERAL SCENARIO
You are the commander of Team Yankee. You are presently
located at company assembly area green (see Figure 12). You
have prepared paragraphs one and two of your operations order
from the Task Force 1-15 extract. You have issued a warning
order and your platoon leaders report that they are
logistically prepared to attack. You are now about to select
your route and prepare parar oh three, Concept of the
Operation.
Please review paragraphs one and two of your operations
order and overlay one (see Figure 12).
1.Situation.
a.Task Organization:
Team Yankee/TF 1-15 (-)
2 Mech. Plts (M2) 1 Tank Plts (Ml) Team HQ
1 Engineer Sqd. w/CEV 1 Stinger 1 Fist
b.Enemy Forces:
Unidentified forces of the Soviet 111TH MRR are defending
in sector. The enemy is estimated tc be at 72% strength in
men, equipment, and supplies. They are preparing defensive
positions. The enemy is equipped with organic BMP IFV's and
BRDM ATV's as well as being reinforced by a T80 Guards Tank
Battalion. Expect enemy artillery support from the RAG using
122 SP's. Other artillery support is also possible. The
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1F
enemy may receive Helo support in the form of HIP or HIND-D
units if our operations are successful. The status of enemy
fixed wing support is not known at this time. The enemy has
positions about 5 kilometers away. Identified enemy units and
positions are provided on the intelligence overlay. Other
larger enemy forces are known to be preparing positions behind
their security zone.
c. Friendly Forces:
Task Force 1-15 attacks to seize Objective George as part
of the 10th Brigade. Team Whiskey and Zulu ,f TF 1-15 are on
our left and right respectively. The task force has a
Battalion of 155 SP's in direct support. Teams Whiskey,Yankee
and Zulu will attack abreast in order to achieve the Task
Force objective. Team Xray is in reserve.
2.Mission.
Team Yankee /TF 1-15 will cross phase line Blue NLT
180500Z and attack the high ground vie. Objective Sam NLT xxxxZ
(see requirements 1-3) in order to seize Objective Sam. Team
Yankee will then defend in place until relieved.
**GENERAL INFORMATION**
* l)Do not cross Phase Lines Stop (Area one) or Hold (Area
Two).
2)Average unit speed is 40 Km per hour.
3)All streams are eacily fordable.
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Figures 12 and 13 are substituting for actual overlays that
were used in the survey. These figures graphically portray
the tactical situation. Figure 12 shows the east-west attack
scenario used in area of operation one. Figure 13 on page 78
shows the north-south attack scenario used in area of
operation two.
"1 -174
Figure 12 The East-West Attack Scenario.
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AREA OF OPERATIONS ONE
REQUIREMENT ONE
Assume you receive overlay one as the intelligence update
from battalion (see Figure 12). The overlay has a note on it
from the battalion commander which states, "This is the latest
intelligence. I have checked it and it is very reliable. I
need you to proceed to your objective as quickly as possible
once you cross phase line blue. The timing of your attack is
critical to the brigade plan. Plan accordingly."
Please draw on Overlay One the movement route that your
unit would follow as it moves from the assembly area to
Objective Sam. Please ensure that you draw only one route on
the overlay. If you would use multiple routes please draw the
route that best describes the center of mass of the company
team.
REQUIREMENT TWO
Assume instead that you receive the same overlay, but a
different note from your battalion commander. The note
attached to it from your battalion commander states: "This is
the latest intelligence. I have checked and it is very
reliable. The timing of your attack is important, but I don't
want you to waste combat power. Your route may take up to 30
minutes to avoid a major engagement prior to the objective.
Plan accordingly."
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Please familiarize yourself with Overlay Two. Remember
that you can take 30 minutes to avoid a premature major
engagement prior to the objective once you cross phase line
Blue.
If your route will change (from Overlay One)- with this
additional time, please draw it on Overlay Two. If your route
does not change write no change on Overlay Two. Once again
please indicate only one route on the overlay.
REQUIREMENT THREE
Assume that everything is exactly the same as REQUIREMENT
TWOexcept that now may take as much time as you would like to
maneuver to the objective.
If your route will change (from Overlay Two) with this
additional time, please draw it on Overlay Three. If your
route does not change write no change on Overlay Three. Once
again please indicate only one route on the overlay.
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iur 13 ThorhSuttac c ni
This ectio ereats th -eurmnso rao
Youar stllth comndrofTa Yake o r o
V. 1
Evrthig esein reatsy the raequsiements of Areratiof
One except that the mission has changed slightly (see below)
to reflect the new area (see Figure 13). To refresh your
memory the scenarios (from Area of Operation One) are repeated
before each requirement. However, if you completely recall the
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scenarios, you need only read and complete the requirement on
the overlays. Your new mission is:
2.Mission
Team Yankee /TF 1-15 will cross phase line Golf NLT
i80500Z and attack the high ground vic Objective Uncle NLT
18xxxxZ (see requirements 4-6) in order to seize Objective
Uncle. Team Yankee will then defend in place until relieved.
REQUIREMENT FOUR
Assume you receive overlay four (see Figure 13)as the
intelligence update from battalion. The overlay has a note on
it from the battalion commander which states, "This is the
latest intelligence. I have checked it and it is very
reliable. I need you to proceed to your objective as quickly
as possible once you cross phase line blue. The timing of
your attack is critical to the brigade plan. Plan
accordingly."
Please draw on Overlay Four the movement route that your
unit would follow as it moves from the assembly area to
Objective Uncle. Please ensure that you draw only one route
on the overlay. If you would use multiple routes please draw




Assume instead that the intelligence remains the same, but
you receive a different note from your battalion commander.
The note from your battalion commander states: "This is the
latest intelligence. I have checked and it is very reliable.
The timing of your attack is important, but I don't want you
to waste combat power. Take up to 30 minutes to avoid a
premature major engagement prior to the objective. Plan
accordingly."
Please familiarize yourself with Overlay Five. Remember
that you can take up to 30 minutes to avoid a major engagement
once you cross phase line Golf.
If your route will change (from Overlay Four) with this
additional time, please draw it on Overlay Five. If your
route does not change write no change on Overlay Five. Once
again please indicate only one route on the overlay.
REQUIREMENT SIX
Assume that everything is exactly the same as REQUIREMENT
FIVE except that now may take as much time as you would like
to maneuver to the objective.
If your route will change (from Overlay Five)with this
additional time, please draw it on Overlay Six. If your route
does not change write no change on Overlay Six. Once again
please indicate only one route on the overlay.
This completes the survey. Thank you for your help.
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APPENDIX C. TABULATED RESULTS
CAMMS/SHAW RESULTS
Complete Route
ATTACK TYPE AVOIDANCE TIME MEAN NUMBER OF VARIANCE OF
BLUE KILLED BLUE KILLED
NORTH-SOUTH 0 8.4 1.87
NORTH-SOUTH 30 4.7 0.94
NORTH-SOUTH 60 5.1 1.49
NORTH-SOUTH 200 13.8 0.46
NORTH-SOUTH 300 7.1 1.37
NORTH-SOUTH 330 5.7 1.6
EAST-WEST 0 11.1 2.43
EAST-WEST 30 7.9 2.7
EAS..-WEST 90 11.6 2.53
EAST-WEST 135 7.83 2.44
EAST-WEST 200 12.0 1.11




ATTACK TYPE AVOIDANCE TIME -MEAN NUMBER OF VARIANCE OF
BLUE KILLED BLUE KILLED
NORTH-SOUTH 0 7.2 1.96
NORTH-SOUTH 30 0 0
NORTH-SOUTH 60 2.67 1.32
NORTH-SOUTH 200 11.5 2.51
NORTH-SOUTH 300 7.1 1.37
NORTH-SOUTH 330 5.1 1.35
EAST-WEST 0 11.1 2.43
EAST-WEST 30 7.9 2.7
EAST-WEST 90 11.6 2.52
EAST-WEST 135 7.83 2.44
EAST-WEST 200 12.0 2.45




AVOIDANCE TIME - 0 MINUTES
SUBJECT IMEAN VARIANCE
CAMMS 8.1 1.96
OFFICER 1 0 0
OFFICER 2 6.4 2.1
OFFICER 3 7.2 1.68
OFFICER 4 13.1 0.46
OFFICER 5 0.6 1.13
OFFICER 6 5.5 1.83
OFFICER 7 10.9 1.75
OFFICER 8 11.2 1.78
OFFICER 9 9.7 2.33
OFFICER 10 3.1 0.96




AVOIDANCE TIME -30 MINUTES
SUBJECT MEAN VARIANCE
CAMMS 4.7 0.94
OFFICER 1 8.0 2.81
OFFICER 2 6.6 1.94
OFFICER 3 7.23 1.68
OFFICER 4 13.1 0.80
OFFICER 5 5.5 1.7
OFFICER 6 13.8 0.91
OFFICER 7 9.9 2.11
OFFICER 8 13.8 0.91
OFFICER 9 11.2 1.48
OFFICER 10 5.7 1.44




AVOIDANCE TIME - MAXIMUM MINUTES
SUBJECT MEAN VARIANCE
CAMMS 5.7 1.6-
OFFI,:ER 1 5.2 2.2
OFFICER 2 3.27 1.2
OFFICER 3 7.23 1.78
OFFICER 4 13.8 0.46
OFFICER 5 13 1.46
OFFICER 6 9.7 2.9
OFFICER 7 9.9 2.11
OFFICER 8 10.6 2.66
OFFICER 9 11.2 1.48
OFFICER 10 5.7 1.44




AVOIDANCE TIME - 0 MINUTES
SUBJECT IMEAN VARIANCE
CAMMS 11.1 2.43
OFFICER 1 5.23 1.82
OFFICER 2 5.8 1.79
OFFICER 3 5.73 1.83
OFFICER 4 4.37 1.73
OFFICER 5 7.7 3.5
OFFICER 6 9.2 2.6
OFFICER 7 5.29 1.48
OFFICER 8 4.17 2.1
OFFICER 9 7.1 2.46
OFFICER 10 7.6 2.58




AVOIDANCE TIME -30 MINUTES
ISUBjECT I MEN- IARIANCE
1AM .92.71
OFCR1 6.7 12.13
OFFICER 2 5.8 J1.79
OFFICER 3 6.2 1l.77
OFFICER 4 2.7 1.86
OFFICER 5 4.97 1-96
OFFICER 6 9_0 2.51
OFFICER 7 6.292.
OFFICER 8 9.09 12.67
OFFICER 9 17.1 12.46
OFFICER 10 1.51.70




AVOIDANCE TIME - MAXIMUM MINUTES[ SUBJECT MEAN VARI4 NCE
CAMMS 10.2 2e7
OFFICER 1 7.8 3.1
OFFICER 2 7.7 2.67
OFFICER 3 6.2 1.77
-OFFICER 4 2.7 1.86
OFFICER 5 4.97 1.96
OFFICER 6 9.0 2.51
OFFICER 7 6.29 2.2
OFFICER 8 8.57 2.10
OFFICER 9 7.1 2.46
OFFICER 10 5.5 1.70
OFFICER MEAN 6.5 2.0
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NORTH-SOUTH ATTACK




OFFICER 1 0Q 0
OFFICER 2 6.4 2.1
OFFICER 3 7.2 1.68
OFFICER 4 4.2 1.5
OFFICER 5 0.6 1.13
OFFICER 6 5.5 1.83
OFFICER 7 10.9 1.75
OFFICER 8 11.2 1.78
OFFICER 9 9-.7 2.33
OFFICER 10 3.1 -0.96
OFFICER MEAN 5.88 3.99
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NORTH-SOUTH ATTACK




OFFICER 1 8.0 2.81
OFFICER 2 6.4 2.07
OFFICER 3 7.2 1.68
OFFICER 4 4.2 1.5
OFFICER 5 0.73 1.3
OFFICER 6 7.2 2.0
OFFICER 7 7.7 2.0
OFFICER 8 9.9 1.47
OFFICER 9 9.7 2.33
OFFICER 10 0.57 1.33
OFFICER MEAN 6.16 3.32
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NORTH-SOUTH ATTACK




OFFICER 1 5.2 2.2
OFFICER 2 1.4 1.2
OFFICER 3 7.2 1.68
OFFICER 4 1.2 1.35
OFFICER 5 0.73 1.3
OFFICER 6 6.9 2.5
OFFICER 7 7.7 2.0
OFFICER 8 7.8 2.0
OFFICER 9 9.7 2.3
OFFICER 10 0.57 1.33
OFFICER MEAN 4.87 3.3
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EAST-WEST ATTACK




OFFICER 1 5.23 1.82
OFFICER 2 5.8 1.79
OFFICER 3 5.3 1.80
OFFICER 4 4.37 1.73
OFFICER 5 7.7 3.5
OFFICER 6 7.2 1.95
OFFICER 7 5.2 1.48
OFFICER 8 4.17 2.1
OFFICER 9 7.0 2.4
OFFICER 10 7.6 2.5
OFFICER MEAN 5.96 1.31
91
EAST-WEST ATTACK
AVOIDANCE TIME -30 MINUTES
AT 1000 METERS
~SUBJECT MEAN j ARANCE
CAI4MS 7.9 2.7-
OFFICER 1 6.47 -2.13
OFFICER 2 5.8 I1.79-
OFFICER 3 6.2 1.77
OFFICER- 4 2.7 1.86
OFFICER- 5 3.7 1.68
OFFICER 6 6.8 1. 74
OFFICER 7 6.29 2.2
OFFICER 8 9.2 2.2
OFFICER 9 7.0 2.4
OFFICER 10 5.5 1.7
OFFICER MEAN 5.97 1.78
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EAST-WEST ATTACK
AVOIDANCE TIME -MAXIMUM MINUTES
AT 1000 METERS
-SUBJECT jM EAN VARIANCE
CAMMS 10.2 2-.7
OFFICER 1 7.8 3-.1
OFFICER 2 7.4 2.66
OFFICER 3 6.1 1.7
OFFICER 4 2.7 1.86
OFFICER 5 3.7 1.6
OFFICER 6 5.2 1.7
OFFICER 7 6.3 2.2
OFFICER 8 8.57 2.10
OFICR9 17.0 2.4
OFFICER 10 5.5~* 1.7
OFFICER MEAN 1 6.02 t1._8
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APPENDIX D. CAMMS/SHAW ROUTES
This appendix depicts the CA1MMS/Shaw routes in the east-
west attack scenario for selected avoidance times in Figures
14 to 25. The Figures were obtained from the CAMS/Shaw model
at TRAC-Monterey using a color Epson printer. The map sheet
is a representation of the Lauterbach area of central Germany.
Briefly, each -point on the map can be described by map grid
coordinates which correspond to the vertical and horizontal
position on the Cartesian coordinate system. The scale of the
map is 1:50,000 The color and patterns on the map represent
contour elevations as follows:
Figure 14 The CAT4IS/Shaw map legend.
The route changes are briefly described in the following
paragraphs:
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Figure 16. The route is the same as Figure 15. This
result is consistent as the algorithm does not consider TMP
for the 0 avoidance time route.
Figure 17. Route changes slightly to a more northern
approach.
Figure 18. Route remains in the north, but slightly
different than the 10 minute route.
Figure 19. Route changes completely to a southern sector
approach.
Figure 20. Route is slightly different, but still in the
southern sector.
Figure 21. Route is moving towards the center, but still
in the southern sector. Figure 22. Route is still moving
towards the center and still in the southern sector.
Figure 23. Route has shifted dramatically to the north.
Figure 24. Route has shifted dramatically again.
Figure 25. Once again, route shifts dramatically.
Figure 26. Route shifts dramatically towards the end of
the approach.
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